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The Political Economy Equilibrium of 




The U.S. has incorporated environmental policies into its all free trade agreements 
since it negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 
1990s. The inclusion of environmental policies represented a major shift in trade 
policy but the environmental policies have not drastically changed in subsequent 
trade agreements over the past 25 years despite the continued involvement of 
environmental constituencies and policymakers. The punctuated equilibrium model 
provides the analytical framework for understanding the factors that gave rise to 
the drastic policy shift under NAFTA as well as the subsequent policy stasis, in 
order to inform future policymaking efforts. Based on this analysis, it appears that 
environmentalists and policymakers will likely be able to maintain the 
environmental policy status quo within the trade policy domain but should consider 









Ever since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1993) was 
negotiated in the early 1990s, it has become a rite of passage for every subsequent 
U.S. trade agreement to be scrutinized for its potential to adversely affect the 
environment. This scrutiny typically gives rise to set-piece political negotiations to 
ensure that some policies are included to address environmental impacts, which in 
turn facilitate passage of the trade agreement. Successive environmental policies 
are frequently presented as being stronger or more far-reaching than earlier policies 
but in reality, the political economy equilibrium and thus content of these policies 
has not changed much over the past 25 years.  
 
The equilibrium reflects the balancing of political and economic factors that 
influence the design of the environmental policies. In a world free of politics, trade 
policies would be designed solely based on economic principles (Friedan 2020). 
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However, trade policies have variable impacts on society and touch upon other 
issues not directly related to tariffs, such as environmental regulations or labor 
rights. The consideration of these non-tariff or distributional issues, in turn, 
introduces other interest groups and politics into the trade policy domain and 
influences trade policy outcomes. Starting with NAFTA, trade policies have 
increasingly been influenced by the politics associated with non-tariff issues, 
including environmental issues (Audley 1997, Destler and Balint 2000).  
 
As a result, a suite of environmental policies has been developed in 
conjunction with all U.S. trade agreements since NAFTA. While no two trade 
agreements have the same exact suite of policies, collectively, the policies have not 
changed drastically over the years, reflecting a stable political economy 
equilibrium. Scholars have written extensively about many aspects of the trade and 
environment policy debate but little attention has focused on the factors that give 
rise to the equilibrium. This article addresses this gap by examining the actors and 
interests that influence development of the policies, and in doing so, can inform 
efforts by policymakers and policy advocates to craft similar policies in future trade 
agreements or more importantly, to seek alternative policy arenas for advancing 
their policy priorities.  
 
The punctuated equilibrium model provides the analytical framework for the 
discussion presented in this article; this model is a well-established policy process 
model that has been widely used to explain emergence and change or stasis of 
policies over time, and it is well-suited to examining trade-related environmental 
policies (Allen 2020). The analysis draws upon qualitative data related negotiation 
of trade-related environmental policies from archival records, published literature, 
and interviews and opinion surveys of key stakeholders involved in policy 
negotiations obtained by Allen (2005, 2018a). Overall, the article is organized as 
follows: first, an overview of environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements is 
provided, followed by a discussion of the actors and factors that contributed to the 
emergence of trade-related environmental policies, followed by discussion of the 
factors that have contributed to their stability, and lastly the conclusions.  
  
 
OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FOR U.S. TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
 
NAFTA was the first trade agreement to explicitly incorporate policies to address 
the potential negative environmental effects of trade liberalization. When this trade 
agreement was negotiated in the early 1990s, environmentalists raised concerns 
over the agreement’s potential to reduce levels of environmental protection in all 
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three NAFTA countries (Audley 1997). In particular, environmentalists claimed 
that freer trade would create ‘pollution havens’ in Mexico due to its’ lax 
enforcement of environmental laws and the relocation of dirty industries there to 
take advantage of lower compliance costs (Allen 2018b). The lax enforcement in 
Mexico, in turn, would foster a race to the bottom in the U.S. and Canada as they 
rolled back their enforcement of laws to retain industries (Allen 2018b). 
Environmentalists also argued that NAFTA would include trade disciplines that 
could be used to challenge to legitimate domestic environmental regulations and 
trade measures in multilateral environmental agreements as discriminatory non-
tariff barriers to trade, and lastly, that trade liberalization under NAFTA would 
more generally accelerate the exploitation of natural resources due to liberalization 
of certain economic sectors and foster a general increase in levels of pollution due 
to economic growth (Allen 2018b).  
 
To address to these environmental concerns, a suite of environmental policies 
was crafted for NAFTA, with a few policies included in the trade agreement itself 
but the majority of policies included in an environmental side agreement to 
NAFTA. Since NAFTA was negotiated, the U.S. has paired a similar suite of 
environmental policies with all its free trade agreement.1 In general, the existing 
suite of environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements is comprised of a mix of 
core “legacy” policies from NAFTA, which focused on the range of concerns 
related to trade liberalization under that agreement, along with a few newer policies 
focused on issues that transcend specific trade agreements, such as protection of 
global common pool resources like marine fisheries (see Table 1) (Allen 2014). In 
general, the salience of the environmental concerns varied somewhat; the most 
salient concerns were associated with lax enforcement of environmental laws and 
the associated policies consisted of a requirement for effective enforcement of laws 
by all trading partners, coupled with various mechanisms to ensure compliance. 
Substantively, there have been some variations in environmental policies across the 
trade agreements, however, taken collectively, the substantive content of these 
policies has not changed significantly over the past 25 years based on detailed 
reviews (Allen 2018a). The sudden emergence of the environmental policies for 
U.S. trade agreements and their relatively stability over time is examined further 
below using the punctuated equilibrium model, a contemporary model of the 





1 As of 2020, the U.S. had negotiated 13 new bilateral and regional free trade agreements since 
NAFTA as well as renegotiated NAFTA, and all but one agreement has been ratified and entered 
into force. The agreement that was not ratified is the Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
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According to the punctuated equilibrium model, the policymaking process is 
“characterized by long periods of incremental change punctuated by brief periods 
of major change” (Sabatier 1999, 9). Policies are formulated within issue-specific 
policy domains or subsystems. Established policy subsystems often foster policy 
stasis or stability, but can be transformed when actors external to the subsystem 
redefine the policy issue and force changes within the subsystem, resulting in major 
policy shifts or “punctuations” (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 2014). The 
central dynamic at play in the punctuated equilibrium model is the changing 
definitions of policy issues and agenda setting, which occurs amid the overlap and 
interaction between the politics of issue-specific policy subsystem(s) and the 
macro-politics of the Congress and presidency (Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 
2014). The redefinition of policy issues may generate political support at the macro-
level for a drastic policy shift. Once this policy shift occurs, the transformed policy 
subsystem establishes a new equilibrium and near policy stasis resumes until the 
policy issues are redefined again and give rise to another major policy shift.  
 
Prior to NAFTA, trade policy in the U.S. had long been crafted by a well-
established policy monopoly operating within a stable policy subsystem. This 
monopoly was comprised of powerful export-oriented producer interest groups 
(e.g. U.S. Chamber of Commerce) and industries and closely aligned pro-free trade 
legislators and bureaucrats (e.g., U.S. Trade Representative) (Destler and Balint 
2000). The policy image (or public perception) of trade policy established by the 
policy monopoly was that it contributed to the economic well-being of all of society 
and for many years this image was not challenged. Environmentalists did not have 
a formal role in the trade policy subsystem and the trade community did not 
consider environmental issues explicitly within free trade agreements (Audley 
1997, Esty 1993). However, this all changed with NAFTA. Due a convergence of 
several factors, environmentalists were able to successfully gain access to the trade 
policy domain and redefine the policy issues within policy subsystem and recast 
the policy image associated with trade liberalization.  
 
Overall, there were four principle factors that converged during the NAFTA 
negotiations that allowed the environmentalists to significantly influence trade 
policy. First, the beneficial view of trade liberalization was already coming under 
attack by the late 1980s as increased foreign competition lead to de-industrialization 
and economic devastation in the U.S. (Aaronson 2001). This competition was even 
more of a concern for trade liberalization with developing countries, such as 
Mexico, that had lower levels of social safeguards for environmental protection and 
labor rights (Congressional Research Service 2017). Thus, efforts to redefine policy 
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issues within the trade policy subsystem were already underway and NAFTA 
provided fertile ground for pursuing those efforts more aggressively.  
 
Second, the existing environmental degradation along the U.S.-Mexico border 
provided a highly visible harbinger of what might occur elsewhere in Mexico as 
trade and investment were further liberalized (Johnson and Beaulieu 1996). This 
degradation was instrumental in recasting the policy image that NAFTA would lead 
to worse environmental conditions. Third, the adverse ruling by a GATT arbitral 
panel in 1991 related to U.S. restrictions on tuna imports from Mexico only 
reinforced the apocalyptic predictions that trade regime rules would undermine 
domestic environmental safeguards (Ritchie 1990, Christensen 1991). Lastly, the 
environmental groups had become adept at successfully advancing their interests 
in other realms of international economic policy, such as development financing by 
the multilateral development banks (Rich 1985) and participation in international 
trade policy was a logical next step.  
 
Against this backdrop, environmentalists established tentative linkages 
between trade liberalization and levels of environmental protection in the three 
NAFTA countries. Using these linkages, they effectively recast the policy image of 
free trade as fostering extensive and dire environmental consequences and reducing 
quality of life in North America. The new policy image was in sharp contrast to the 
existing image of free trade benefiting all of society as it fostered economic 
efficiency. As a result of the policy issue redefinition and image recasting, the 
environmentalists, comprised of a mixed of border and national-level 
environmental groups, upset the trade policy monopoly and gained access to the 
trade policy subsystem in the U.S. along with closely aligned pro-free trade / pro-
environment legislators and bureaucrats (e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency), significantly transforming the policy subsystem (Audley 1997). The 
environmental groups’ participation in the policy subsystem ultimately resulted in 
the inclusion of a suite of environmental policies in NAFTA, a major shift in policy 
compared to the status quo prior to that trade agreement (Audley 1997). At that 
time, a new political economy equilibrium was established within the trade policy 
subsystem that has remained fairly stable, with only incremental changes to the 
environmental policies over the past 25 years. The main reason for this stability is 
that the environmentalists have not been able to recast the trade policy image or 
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Without a doubt, the emergence of environmental policies in the trade policy 
subsystem during the NAFTA negotiations is attributed to the ability of the 
environmental groups to effectively redefine trade policy issues and recast the 
policy image within the subsystem. These actions generated political support from 
members of the U.S. Congress and President to incorporate environmental policies 
into NAFTA (Bush 1995, Clinton 1995, Browner 1995, Audley 1997). A 
convergence of several factors at a particular point in time, as noted above, created 
a unique window of opportunity for environmentalists to gain access to the trade 
policy domain and mobilize public opinion and macro-level political support to 
change the policy status quo. Their ability to mobilize support was so effective that 
including addressing the environmental concerns became a political imperative for 
passage of NAFTA (Audley 1997, Mayer 1998, Johnson and Beaulieu 1996).  
 
As it turned out, however, the intense debate and public concern over the 
environmental impacts of NAFTA was a high-water mark for U.S. trade 
agreements. Since NAFTA, environmentalists have not been able to replicate that 
feat and attain a similar level of public mobilization or macro-level political support 
for any subsequent U.S. trade agreement. As a result, the substantive content of the 
environmental policies for U.S. trade agreements has remained fairly stable since 
NAFTA and only incremental policy changes have been made for other trade 
agreements. In other words, the trade policy subsystem reached a new political 
economy equilibrium during NAFTA negotiations and it has not changed 
drastically over the past 25 years. Overall, there are several reasons for the stability 
of trade policy subsystem, which is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.  
 
First and foremost, the dire predictions of an environmental apocalypse in the 
NAFTA countries never materialized (Gallagher 2004, Stern 2007, Vaughan 2004). 
As a result, the political saliency of the environmental concerns diminished within 
the trade policy subsystem. Second, many of the subsequent U.S. trade agreements 
have been with countries that either have adequate levels of environmental 
protection (e.g. Australia, Singapore) or limited competitive advantages (e.g. 
Bahrain, Jordan, Oman), further diminishing the saliency of the environmental 
issues. Third, the environmental policies that were developed for NAFTA and other 
trade agreements have had little impact on improving environmental conditions for 
trading partners (Tollefson 2002, Dorn 2007, Knox 2010, Environmental Groups 
Say 2007, Allen 2018a, Allen 2012, USTR Comes Under Fire 2015), which 
highlights the limitations of using trade policy as a vehicle for achieving broader 
environmental policy objectives. 
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Although the saliency for environmental concerns within the trade policy 
subsystem decreased after NAFTA, environmentalists have remained actively 
involved in trade policy negotiations and a few of the more recent trade agreements 
have received some scrutiny within the subsystem. In particular, the regional trade 
agreement with five Central American countries and the Dominican Republic (DR-
CAFTA) (Environmentalists’ Letter 2004, Abetti 2008), the regional Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP, which was negotiated but not adopted by the U.S.) (U.S. 
Environmental Groups 2010), and the bilateral trade agreement with Peru 
(Environmental Groups Unlikely 2007, Environmental Groups Laud 2007) have 
received some level of scrutiny by environmentalists. The most recent trade 
agreement completed by the U.S. in 2019, the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA), however, received very limited scrutiny when compared to 
its predecessor, NAFTA (Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Laurens, et al. 
2019, Gantz 2019, W&M Democrats 2019). 
 
Given the low levels of scrutiny, environmentalists have struggled to 
drastically redefine trade policy issues within the policy subsystem, much less 
generate macro-level political support for drastic policy shifts. Nonetheless, the 
environmental groups have achieved a few policy innovations in these trade 
agreements, such as the forestry sector governance provisions in the Peru trade 
agreement (Environmental Groups Laud 2007) and the illegal, unregulated and 
unreported fishing provisions in the TPP (U.S. TPP Environment Proposal 2011, 
USTR Touts 2011, Tsangalis 2016, Addressing Conservation Challenges 2013) and 
the USMCA (Tienharra 2019, Stewart and Noorbaloochi 2019). However, when 
considering these newer environmental policies within the larger suite of existing 
policies, these changes have been marginal (see Table 1) (Allen 2018a). The 
inability of the environmental groups to drastically redefine trade policy issues or 
reset the policy agenda since NAFTA is most clearly reflected in the recent 
negotiation of the USMCA. 
 
Given the attention that environmental issues received during negotiation of 
NAFTA as well as the long-standing criticisms of the limited impact its 
environmental policies have had, it was anticipated that environmental issues 
would be front and center during the negotiation of the USMCA (Page 2007, Mach 
2008, Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Environmental Groups Unlikely 
2007, Levin Warns 2009, Labor Unions, Enviros 2014). However, instead of 
identifying new environmental policy concerns that would redefine the trade policy 
issues that warrant attention, the environmentalists have often identified the same 
concerns related to implementation of multi-lateral environmental agreements or 
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the investor-state dispute settlement process2 that have been repeatedly raised for 
past trade agreements (Environmental Groups: USMCA 2018, Sierra Club 2018b, 
Sierra Club 2018a). In lieu of presenting dire images of the environmental havoc 
that would occur due to further trade liberalization, environmentalists advanced 
nuanced arguments about legal minutiae that clearly failed to mobilize public 
opinion or macro-level politics. 
 
In addition to the lack of a compelling narrative for redefining policy issues or 
a radical recasting of the trade policy image compared to status quo, the 
environmental groups that are actively involved in the trade policy subsystem have 
evolved (see Tables 2 and 3) and current groups may have less potential to affect 
policy changes. In general, many of the environmental groups that now participate 
in trade policy negotiations have in the past been hostile to policy negotiations, such 
as Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, or Greenpeace USA, or are new to the trade 
policy subsystem, or lack strong national-level environmental policy bona fides, 
such as Food & Water Watch, Hip Hop Caucus, Power Shift Network, or 
GreenLatinos (Sierra Club 2018b, Sierra Club 2018a). As such, it is not clear that 
their new policy proposals are even achievable. Even though these environmental 
groups have attained some marginal policy changes in recent years, their 
involvement in the trade policy subsystem at this point seems more geared towards 
preventing policy backsliding rather than radically redefining policy issues or 
recasting policy images to advance new environmental policies. In light of the 
weaken position of environmentalists, it is not surprising that the political economy 
equilibrium for the trade policy subsystem and suite of environmental policies for 
trade agreements has remained fairly stable and is likely to remain so for the 





For almost three decades, the U.S. has been at the forefront of incorporating 
environmental policies into its all free trade agreements to address the potential 
adverse environmental impacts of trade liberalization (Allen 2018a, Jinnah and 
Morgera 2013, Van Roozendaal 2009). NAFTA was the first trade agreement to 
include environmental policies and the emergence of these policies represented a 
major policy shift within the trade policy domain. Prior to NAFTA, trade policy 
 
2 See e.g., environmentalists’ comments on Trans-Pacific Partnership, “Solomon specifically 
pointed out that the bill does not preclude negotiators from including an investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanism in trade agreements and argued that such provisions can open the 
door to private corporations suing governments over regulations related to environmental protection. 
ISDS has been part of U.S. trade policy in every major recent trade agreement.” 
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had been crafted by a relatively small group of pro-free trade advocates within a 
stable policy subsystem and environmental policy issues had not been explicitly 
considered within the context of free trade agreements. However, a convergence of 
events in the early 1990s created a window of opportunity for environmental groups 
to gain access to the trade policy subsystem and redefine trade policy issues and 
recast the trade policy image. By doing so, these groups were able to mobilize 
public opinion and macro-level political support to advance their policy priorities 
for mitigating the environmental impacts of NAFTA.  
 
This transformation of the trade policy system has allowed environmental 
groups to continue to participate in the trade policy negotiations and ensure a 
similar suite of environmental policies is included in all subsequent trade 
agreements. Over the years, these groups added a few innovative policies, but 
collectively, the environmental policies associated with trade agreements have not 
changed drastically. This near policy stasis reflects a new political economy 
equilibrium within the trade policy subsystem that environmentalists have not been 
able to change. One of the main reasons why the post-NAFTA equilibrium has been 
so resistant to change is that many of the environmental concerns raised during 
NAFTA never materialized, undermining the rationale for many of the original 
policies. Although these policies have been retained over the years to forestall 
claims of backsliding, the lack of a credible basis for policies casts a long shadow 
over subsequent environmental policy negotiations. In addition, the coalition of 
environmental groups actively involved in the trade policy subsystem has evolved 
and appears to have a more limited ability to affect policy change.   
 
As such, the existing political economy equilibrium and suite of environmental 
policies associated with U.S. trade agreements is likely to remain the same for the 
foreseeable future and the continued participation of environmental groups in the 
trade policy domain will ensure that this status quo is maintained. However, given 
their limited ability to advance substantively different policies within the trade 
policy domain, environmentalists and policymakers should consider looking for a 
new policy arena to advance their environmental policy priorities. Overall, U.S. 
trade agreements have more recently been viewed merely as useful vehicles for 
achieving non-agreement related environmental policy goals that have not been 
adequately addressed in other venues, reflecting a process of “regime shifting” 
(Laurens and Morin 2019). Thus, it is perhaps time to shift to a different policy 
subsystem given the stasis achieved in the trade policy domain. 
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Table 1: Policies by Substantive Content and Policy Locus* 
 Environmental Policy NAFTA 
Other U.S. Trade 
Agreements 












s Levels of environmental protection ESA FTA FTA FTA 
Procedural guarantees, access to proceedings, right to seek remedies ESA FTA FTA FTA 
Opportunities for public participation ESA FTA and ESA FTA FTA 
Voluntary mechanisms to enhance environmental performance - FTA FTA FTA 
Corporate social responsibility - - FTA FTA 






















Environmental cooperation ESA FTA and ESA FTA and ESA FTA and ESA 
Work plan or program ESA ESA - ESA 
Periodic or regular meetings ESA ESA FTA ESA 
Benchmarks or performance indicators - ESA FTA ESA 















Effective enforcement domestic environmental laws ESA FTA FTA FTA 
State-to-state consultation and dispute settlement process ESA FTA FTA FTA 
Environmental experts in dispute resolution ESA FTA FTA FTA 














Privilege MEA obligations over trade agreement obligations FTA FTA - FTA 
Enhance mutual supportiveness of FTA and MEA obligations - FTA FTA - 
Support environmental goals of FTA ESA - - - 
Evaluate environmental effects of FTA ESA - - - 
Complete independent reports ESA - - - 
Develop transboundary environmental assessment protocol ESA - - - 
Promote trade in environmental goods and services - - FTA FTA 
Adopt, maintain, and implement laws to fulfill MEA obligations - FTA FTA FTA 
Forest sector governance - FTA - - 
Illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing, fisheries subsidies, sustainable forestry - - FTA FTA 
* Policy locus is location of the policy, environmental side agreement (“ESA”) and free trade agreement (“FTA”). Source: (Allen 2018a)
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Table 2: Interest Groups for NAFTA Environmental Policy Negotiations 
Interest Group Specific organization 
Moderate or accommodating 
environmental group 
National Wildlife Federation 
World Wildlife Fund 
Environmental Defense Fund 
The Nature Conservancy 
National Audubon Society 
Defenders of Wildlife 
Natural Resources Defense Council 
Pollution Probe 
Union of Environmental Groups 
Autonomous Institute for Ecological Research 
Group of Hundred 





Friends of the Earth 
Texas Center for Policy Studies 
Mexican Action Network on Free Trade 
Pact of Ecologist Group 
Border Health and Environmental Network 
Canadian Environmental Law Association 
Action Canada Network 
Private sector interest groups 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
Business Roundtable 
Border Trade Alliance 
U.S. Alliance for NAFTA 
National Foreign Trade Council 
The U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee 
Trade Partnership 
U.S. Council of International Business 
The Council of the Americas 
Emergency Committee for American Trade 
National Association of Manufacturers 
American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico 
Coordinating Organization of Business Agencies of Foreign Trade 
Source: (Allen 2005) 
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Table 3: Interest Groups for Other Trade Agreement Environmental Policy Negotiations  
Trade Agreement Specific organization 
DR-CAFTA 
Center for International Environmental Law 
Defenders of Wildlife 
Earthjustice 
Friends of the Earth 
League of Conservation Voters 
National Environmental Trust 
Latin America Natural Resources Defense Council 




Lead Organizations  
Defenders of Wildlife 
Earthjustice 
Environmental Investigation Agency 




Oceana, Natural Resources Defense Council, Alaska Wilderness League, Clean 
Water Action, Endangered Species Coalition, Environment America, 
Environmental Defense Fund, Humane Society International, Humane Society of 
the United States, League of Conservation Voters, National Audubon Society, 
National Parks Conservation Association, Native American Rights Fund, Ocean 
Conservancy, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Population Action 







350.org, Center for Biological Diversity, Center for International 
Environmental Law, Earthjustice, Food & Water Watch, Friends of the 
Earth, Green For All, GreenLatinos, Greenpeace USA, Hip Hop Caucus, 
League of Conservation Voters, Oil Change International, People’s 
Action, Power Shift Network, Sunrise Movement 
Sources:  (Sierra Club 2018a, Addressing Conservation Challenges 2013, U.S. Environmental Groups 2010, 
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